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SPLITTING THE ATOM OF MARSHALL'S
WISDOM
SUSAN HERMAN*
I very much appreciate being invited to participate in the panel
here today. I have been teaching constitutional law for a number
of years, and although I frequently interact with the Supreme
Court, both by court watching and observing, and also by, as Phil
said, sometimes writing amicus briefs, I have really welcomed
the opportunity to learn more about Justice Marshall, the person
behind the opinions which we all cite so often, both from my
stellar co-panelists who have given us a lot to think about, and
from some of the reading I did in preparation for today.
The remarks that I want to make today very much follow up on
what Judge Gibbons was just saying because in talking about the
ideas that Justice Marshall and his contemporaries had about
how to, as Justice Kennedy put it, split the atom of sovereignty,
how to decide what the federal government gets to do and what
the states get to do,' Judge Gibbons was focusing mostly on
Marshall's understanding of the proper spheres of operation for
the federal and state governments. He also talked at the end a
little bit about the process question that I want to address, which
is, who is going to make the decision about what is a proper
national question, and what powers should be left to the states?
' Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; B.A. 1968 Barnard College; J.D., 1974 N.Y.U.
Law School. I would like to thank Michele Kenney for her exemplary research assistance,
Brooklyn Law School for the continuing support of its research stipend program, and the
St. John's Journal students, who amplified my talk
1 See United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating "The Framers split the atom of sovereignty"). See
generally Judith Olans Brown & Peter D. Enrich, Nostalgic Federalism, 28 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 1, 17 (2000) (describing Justice Kennedy's use of this metaphor as a
command to Congress to accord states esteem as joint participants in federal system);
Ernest A. Young, Alden v. Maine and the Jurisprudence of Structure, 41 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1601, 1671 (2000) (noting "Justice Kennedy is fond of saying, '[tihe Framers split the
atom of sovereignty'.").
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Now, although the Constitution clearly does skim some power
off the top for the federal government, the Constitution does not
address the question of how to decide when the federal
government dips too deeply, if ever.
One thing that Marshall brought to this debate was his
commentary in McCulloch v. Maryland,2 an opinion that contains
that so many fascinating thoughts as applicable today as in his
own time. First, Justice Marshall was very clear about the fact
that it is not the states that should decide what the national
government gets to do.3 As Judge Gibbons described, Maryland
wanted to decide that there should not be a United States bank
and that if there was to be a bank, they should be able to tax it.4
Justice Marshall very clearly said no, a state cannot decide what
the federal government gets to do because not all the people who
will be affected by that decision are represented in that state.5
Therefore, it was clear to Justice Marshall that the decision
about what the federal government was to do and how it was
going to apply its enumerated powers had to be made at the
federal level. But that does not answer the question of how to
split the atom of federal power. Can Congress just decide for
itself what it should do? To what extent does the Executive
Branch have a role in this policy decision? And, our central
question of judicial review, to what extent can the courts say to
Congress no, you are wrong, you have exceeded your powers
under the Constitution?
As a number of people have said today before me, it was in
Marbury v. Madison,6 of course, that Justice Marshall took the
position that it is emphatically the province of the courts to say
what the law is, 7 and as you have heard, interpreted the
2 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
3 See id. at 432 (stating"The American people... did not design to make their
government dependent on the states.").
4 See McCuLloch, 17 U.S. at 317-18 (discussing Maryland's law that imposed tax on all
banks in state not chartered by state legislature).
5 See Id. at 431 (noting "The legislature of the Union alone.., can be trusted by the
people with the power of controlling measures which concern all.. ."); Philip Bobbitt, Is
Law Politics 41 STAN. L. REV. 1233, 1269 (1989) (stating that Maryland legislature was
forbidden to tax federal instrumentality because such tax extends to people who are not
represented in Maryland's state legislature).
6 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
7 See id. at 177 (stating "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is."); David E. Engdahl, John Marshail's "Jeffersonian"
Concept of Judicial Review, 42 DUKE L. J. 279, 326 (1992) (quoting Chief Justice
[Vol. 16:371
SPLITI7NG THE ATOM OFMARSHALL 'S WISDOM
Constitution to be a part of "the law."8 The current majority of
the Supreme Court, the Federalism Five,9 as they are sometimes
called, in decision after decision invoke Marbury v. Madison
when they want to invalidate Congressional acts, which they
have wanted to do increasingly often in recent years.10 According
to one survey I read, since the days of Marbury v. Macison, the
Supreme Court has invalidated 150 acts of Congress." That is
less than one per year if you do the divsion.
During the last six years, however, just taking the 1994 to
1999 Terms, since the 2000 Term is not yet over, the court
invalidated twenty-five acts of Congress. 12 That is quadruple the
rate of overruling. In every one of these cases, the Court tells us
that the Constitution is made up of words, and that these words
set inherent limits on what the federal government can do.13
Therefore, as a part of its mandate to interpret the Constitution,
it is up to the Court to decide how far the powers of Congress
Marshall's famous words endorsing the concept of judicial review).
8 See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177 (finding "Certainly all those who have framed written
constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the
nation...."); David L. Faigman, 'Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding': Exploring the
Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 556-57
(1991) (stating "According to Chief Justice Marshall, the Constitution forms 'the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation'."); see also Sylvia Snowiss, Text and
Principle in John Marshall's Constitutional Law The Cases of Marbury and McCulloch,
33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 973, 973 (2000) (discussing Marshall's view a written
Constitution is to be enforced in courts like law).
9 See Mark A. Miller, Note, The Clean AirActAmendments of 1990 and an Unbridled
Spending Power: Will They Survive on the Supreme Court's Road to Substantive
Federalism 46 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 159, 169 n.72 (1998) (stating that "pro-federalism five"
comprises Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas).
10 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 936-37 (1997) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (invoking Marburyto explain that federal government has limited powers and
may not enlist state officials to carry out federal policies); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (invalidating right under Indian Gaming Regulatory Act to override
State's sovereign immunity); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (holding
that Gun-Free Zones Act of 1990 exceeds Congress' commerce clause power).
11 See Leon Friedman, Symposium, The Supreme Court and State and Local
Government Law the 1998-99 Term, 16 TOURO L. REV. 265, 265 (1999). See generally
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47 (quashing right under Indian Gaming Regulatory Act to
override State's sovereign immunity); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551 (nullifying Gun-Free Zones
Act of 1990).
12 See, e.g., Coll. Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666, 691 (1999) (holding that Trademark Remedy Clarification Act did not validly
abrogate Florida's sovereign immunity); Printz, 521 U.S. at 934 (1997) (invalidating
Brady Act in that federal government may not enlist state officials to carry out federal
policies).
13 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584 (Thomas J., concurring) (stating that there are real
limits to federal power); United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 847
(1995) (Thomas J., O'Connor J. & Scalia J., dissenting) (stating federal powers are limited
by Constitution).
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extend and how far the national powers extend, and by process of
exclusion, what powers are left to the states. That is how
Marbury v. Madison is consistently being invoked.14
I think that what the current Court is missing is that Justice
Marshall believed that there was an essential corollary to the
proposition of judicial review, the one that Judge Gibbons just
articulated. The corollary is about the essential role of the
political branches of the federal government in making these
decisions. 15
It is not surprising that Marshall had a lot of insight into how
the federal government's three branches would interact, because
he had had the unique opportunity, as you have heard from
Charles Hobson, to serve in all three branches.16 He had been a
member of Congress;' 7 he had been Secretary of State; 8 and he
ended up being Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.19 Therefore
he had a very strong understanding of what he perceived of as
the necessary relationship between law and politics.
In McCulloch v. Maryland, Justice Marshall told us, in several
different ways, that the decision about whether or not
establishing a bank of the United States was a "necessary and
proper" thing for Congress to do, whether it was an appropriate
exercise of Congress' constitutional powers, was not a decision for
14 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997) (invoking Marburyto
divide federal and state powers); Printz, 521 U.S. at 937 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(invoking Marbury as means of limiting federal government); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566
(relying on Marbury to limit Congress' commerce clause powers).
15 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421 ("the sound construction of the constitution must
allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the
powers it conferred are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to
perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people.").
16 See Walter Dellinger & H. Jefferson Powell, Marshall's Question, 2 GREEN BAG 2D
367, 367 (1999) (analyzing Marshall's experience in the executive and legislative branches
in exploring Marshall's definition of "political law"); Jean Edward Smith, Marshall
Misconstrued: Activist? Partisan? Reactionary 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1109, 1109
(2000) (stating Chief Justice Marshall brought his experience as Secretary of State and in
House of Representatives to the bench).
17 See Samuel R. Olken, Chief Justice Marshall and the Course of American
Constitutional History, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 743, 754 (2000) (stating that in 1798
John Marshall became member of Congress); Samuel R. Olken, ChiefJustice Marshall in
Historical Perspective, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 137, 147 (1997) (recognizing Marshall's
service as member of Congress); Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive
Expediency and Executive Agreements, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 690 (1998) (acknowledging
John Marshall's service in Congress).
18 See Smith, supra note 16, at 1109 (noting Marshall's service as Secretary of State).
19 See id. at 1109 (2000) (discussing characteristics Marshall brought to bench when
he was appointed Chief Justice).
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the courts to make. 20 To the snickers of generations of law
students ever since, Marshall did some extremely fast footwork
in interpreting the meaning of the words "necessary and proper,"
and concluded, as he said, that the question of what is necessary
and proper is to be addressed "in another place."2 1
He might have said something that would sound a lot more like
the current Court's opinions. He might have said that if the
Constitution provides that Congress can only do what is
"necessary" and "proper," then the Court, deciding what the law
is, must decide what is "necessary" and "proper" and therefore
should tell Congress when they are out of bounds. "Necessary
and proper," as a term in the Constitution, could have been
treated as an opportunity for the Court to "say what the law is."22
Marshall did not take that approach because he understood that
the important, essential corollary to judicial review was judicial
self-restraint. 23 He knew that if the Court did not defer on
occasion to Congress's determinations, that rather than being the
co-equal branch that Charles Hobson described, the Court would
start to become more than equal;24 the Supreme Court would
truly become supreme.
So in several of his opinions, particularly in McCulloch and in
Gibbons v. Ogden,25 Justice Marshall observes that what is
"necessary and proper" is to be decided by Congress.2 6 He tells us
20 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 412-14, 418, 420, 422 (1819) (employing
phrase "necessary and proper").
21 Id. at 423 ("But, were [a federal bank's necessity less apparent, none can deny it
being an appropriate measure; and if it is, the degree of necessity, as has been very justly
observed, is to be discussed in another place.").
22 See Marbury, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803) (stating that it is "essence of judicial duty" to
determine what law governs case).
23 But see Richard A- Posner, The Meaning of Judicial Restraint; 59 IND. L.J. 1, 14
(1983) (declaring that Marshall did not exercise judicial self-restraint).
24 See Charles F. Hobson, Editing Marshall, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 823, 853 (2000)
[hereinafter Editing Marshall(stating that Marshall was aware of possible attacks by
legislature and walked "a fine line between activism and restraint"); Charles F. Hobson,
The Origins of Judicial Review, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 811, 816 (1999)[hereinafter
Oiginsl (pointing out that Marshall limited judicial power, enabling judiciary to maintain
judicial review); see also Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 130 (1810) (Marshall using restraint
in delivering decision of Court).
25 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (dealing with clause and conflict between States and Federal
government).
26 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 187 (understanding that"Congress is authorized 'to make
all laws which shall be necessary and proper for the purpose."); McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 422
(stating that if judicial department determined law's necessity, it would tread on
legislative ground); see also Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 22 (1825) (stating that
Congress is to make all laws that are "necessary and proper").
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in Gibbons v. Ogden that the only real limitation on the national
Congress in deciding the range of its actions is a political limit.27
As he says, "the wisdom and discretion of Congress, their identity
with the people, and the influence which their constituents
possess at elections are in this, as in many other instances, as
that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which
they have relied to secure them from its abuse. They are the
restraints on which the people must often rely solely in all
representative governments."28
In a speech that Marshall had given before the House of
Representatives in 1800, Marshall, who was himself a
Representative at that point, made some very interesting
remarks about the role of Congress in deciding the meaning of
the Constitution.29 In describing the concept of what I think we
would have to call "political law," Marshall suggested that there
is no sharp distinction between "law" and "politics."30 He wanted
to leave appropriate space for the co-equal branches of the
federal government, particularly for Congress, to participate in
decisions about what the role of the national government would
be.31
27 See Gibbons, 27 U.S. at 197 (stating that "influence which [Congress'] constituents
possess at elections are sole restraints on which they have relied, to them secure from its
abuse").
28 Id. at 197 ("The wisdom and discretion of Congress, their identity with the people,
and the influence which their constituents posses at elections, are ... the sole restraints
on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse")..
29 See THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 82 (Charles T. Cullen, ed., 1984) (providing
text of Congressman Marshall's speech before House of Representatives on controversy
surrounding extradition of Jonathan Robbins); see also Editing Marshall, supra note 27,
at 872 (describing renewed interest in Marshall's speech among legal scholars because in
addition to being "seminal document" concerning president's authority over foreign
affairs, it also "clarifies the meaning of Marshall's famous distinction between law and
politics uttered in Marburf'). See generally Dellinger & Powell, supra note 16, at 370
(claiming that notion that judiciary has exclusive authority to interpret Constitution is
refuted by power vested in Congress to pass legislation, which requires that Congress
make judgments about constitutionality of proposed legislation).
30 See THE PAPERS OF MARSHALL, supra note 29, at 103 (stating that questions of
political law are not to be decided by courts); see also Dellinger & Powell, supra note 16,
at 373 (arguing that Marshall believed resolution of some issues involving interpretation
of law required discretionary judgment commonplace in politics and, although those
issues still involved application of legal norms, such political law questions were properly
committed to Congress or president and not courts).
31 See THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 29, at 95 (arguing that legislative
and executive branches of government would be swallowed up by courts if judicial power
were extended to every question under Constitution or laws and treaties of United
States); see also David E. Marion, The State of the Canon in Constitutional Law: Lessonsfrom the Jurisprudence of John Marshall, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 385, 408-09 (2001)
(arguing that Marshall never went so far as to argue that Court could examine any
SPLITTING THE ATOM OF MARSHALL'S WISDOM
That is the part of Marshall's legacy that I think today's
Supreme Court has forgotten. We could say that the current
Court has split the atom of Marshall's wisdom. The majority in
virtually every case, the same five person majority in the dozen
cases that Marty Flaherty mentioned plus a number of others,
consistently cites Marbury v. Madison.32 It is the Court's power
and obligation to,say what the law is, regardless of what
Congress wishes to do.
The dissenters, the same four dissenters in almost all of those
opinions cite MeCulloch v. Maryland. They cite Gibbons v.
Ogden. They cite the need for the Court to be partners with
Congress and to sometimes defer to Congress's political
determinations about how to use their power.33
There are many different respects in which the current Court
has been far from deferential to Congress. I will give you a few
examples, assuming that you are probably familiar with the
recent cases, at least to some extent.
First, with respect to fact-finding, the low water mark of
judicial deference to Congress' fact-finding, I think, came earlier
this term in the case of University of Alabama v. Garrett.34 That
was the case in which the Court decided that Congress was not
permitted to allow individuals to sue the states under the
Americans with Disabilities Act 35 because of the Eleventh
matter that appered to be constitutional).
32 See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) (holding that
Congress lacks authority to override Supreme Courts rulings by legislating); Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 922 (1995) (citing its duty under Marbury to say what law is,
Court explained that it could not surrender its role in enforcing constitutional limits on
race-based state action to executive branch).
33 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 628 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(stating that "[b]y passing legislation, Congress indicates its belief that there is factual
support for its exercise of commerce power and courts may only review such factual
findings for rationality, not for soundness); Coll. Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 701-02 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (claiming
that Supreme Court's protection of state sovereign immunity prohibits Congress from
achieving one of basic goals of federalism, because such protection deprives Congress of
legislative flexibility necessary to decentralize governmental decision making and to
provide local citizens with variety of enforcement powers, thereby making it more difficult
to protect individual liberty); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 77 (1996) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (describing Court's holding that Congress may not create private federal
cause of action against state as narrow and illogical because it prevents Congress from
providing citizens with federal forum for wide range of actions against states).
34 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
35 Equal Opportunity For Individuals With Disabilities Employment 42 U.S.C. §§
12111-12117 (2001).
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Amendment. 36 In looking to see whether or not Congress was
responding to a constitutionally cognizable problem, the Court
scrutinized the rather extensive hearings that Congress had
conducted and concluded that Congress simply did not have
enough evidence that the states themselves had been
discriminating against disabled people. 37
Now, the dissenters, of course, looked at the same evidence and
felt there was plenty of evidence on the basis of which Congress
could have concluded that there was a problem with respect to
the states denying disabled people equal treatment.38
The four dissenters consistently, since the Lopez3 9 case, have
been asking, why are we second-guessing Congress? Why are we
asking what we think the facts show? Why do we not ask the
more removed question, did Congress have a rational basis for
their conclusion?40 Why do not we show Congress some deference
in their process of deciding what they think about the state of the
facts, as found according to their legislative, political power, and
whether there is a problem requiring national attention.
So the Court has not been very deferential with respect to
legislative fact-finding. And it is ironic that in some of the
significant cases that the Supreme Court has decided recently,
the record that Congress had compiled to justify its own actions
was with respect to legislation that was drafted before Congress
could have known the Court's current rules.
36 U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360 (holding that suits by state
employees to recover money damages from state for its failure to comply with Title I of
Americans with Disabilities Act are barred by Eleventh Amendment).
37 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368 (stating that Congress could not identify pattern and
history of unconstitutional employment discrimination by states because majority of
incidences describing discrimination against disabled individuals contained in Congress'
record did not deal with activities of states).
38 See id. at 970 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress compiled vast
legislative record that documented society-wide discrimination against disabled persons
and that such powerful evidence of societal discrimination implicated not only private
persons and local governments, but state governments as well).
39 514 U.S. 549, 603, 608, 615 (1995). (noting four dissenters were Justices Stevens,
Souter, Breyer and Ginsburg).
40 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 618 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asserting that correct question
to ask is "whether Congress could have had a rational basis for finding a significant (or
substantial) connection between gun-related school violence and interstate commerce").
See generally Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 192 (2001)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that majority's "miserly" construction of Clean Air Act
incorrectly narrows power of Congress under Commerce Clause); Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898, 939 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority's holding
that provisions of Brady Act were infringement on state sovereignty and
unconstitutional).
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In the Lopez case in 1995, the Supreme Court held that
Congress did not have enough power under the Commerce
Clause to enact the Gun-Free School Zones Act.41 Congress
essentially had held no hearings regarding that legislation
because they did not think they needed to.42 It had been many
decades since the Supreme Court had even questioned Congress'
use of its authority under the Commerce Clause.43 And so
Congress did not feel the need to have show hearings so they held
none.
Lopez was considered by some to be a shot across the bow, and
many people thought that the holding of the case would not
really go anywhere.4 4 However, Chief Justice Rehnquist, just
before deciding Lopez, urged in Congress not to pass the Violence
Against Women Act ("VAWA").45 Congress enacted VAWA
despite Justice Rehnquist's concern that the statute gave the
federal courts too great a role in trying to protect the civil rights,
as Congress thought, of women who were subjected to domestic
and other forms of violence.46
Last term in United States v. Morrson,47 the Supreme Court
went back, looked at the Violence Against Women Act and held
that Congress did not have sufficient power either under the
41 18 U.S.C. § 922 (q) (2001) (providing in pertinent part, "it shall be unlawful for any
individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has
reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone."); see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 (finding that
Gun Free School Zones Act does not regulate activity that "substantially affects"
interstate commerce).
42 See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971) (stating that "Congress need
not make particularized findings in order to legislate"); Jennifer R. Hagan, Notes and
Comments: Can We Lose the Battle and Still Win the War?: The Fight Against Domestic
Violence after the Death of Title III of the Violence Against Women Ac 50 DEPAUL L.
REV. 919, 924 n.30 (2001) (stating "Before the United States Supreme Court's decision in
U.S. v. Lopez, it would have seemed that legislative findings connecting an action to
interstate commerce would be enough.").
43 See Schechter v. United States., 295 U.S. 723 (1935) (finding that section 3 of
National Industrial Recovery Act exceeded power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Cautioning Congress to Pull Back, N.J. L.J., Aug.
28, 1995, at 14 (noting that Lopez was first time since New Deal that Court had struck
down federal statute for exceeding Congress' Commerce Clause power).
44 See Jackson, supra note 43, at 14 (contending that because Lopez was 5-4 decision,
it would be difficult to predict its future effect).
45 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2001). See 138 Cong. Rec. E746-01, E747 (1992).
46 See Margo L. Ely, Federal Law Protecting Women Begets a House Divided, Ci.
DAILY L. BULLETIN, April 12, 1999 (noting that in 1992, before VAWA was passed,
Rehnquist complained that it would involve federal courts in numerous domestic
disputes); see also 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2001) (stating that purpose of act is to "protect the
civil rights of victims of gender-motivated violence and to promote public safety, health
and activities affecting interstate commerce").
47 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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Commerce Clause or under the Fourteenth Amendment 48 to
enact that statute.49 As I just mentioned, Chief Justice Rehnquist
views about VAWA were conveyed to Congress just before Lopez
was decided, so Congress could not have known at the time that
they passed VAWA that Lopez, with its more demanding
standards, was coming. Thus, Congress did not know how much
of a record they would have needed to put together. Nevertheless,
their record was fairly extensive. They compiled a great deal of
information about the impact of domestic violence on interstate
commerce and the impact on the nation's economy.50 The Court,
however, was not convinced that the problem justified the
solution Congress had chosen.51
In addition to looking skeptically at Congress' findings of fact,
the second way in which the current Supreme Court has declined
to defer to Congress is in deciding the appropriate scope of
Congress's "necessary and proper" actions. In Morrison, the
Supreme Court does not actually question Congress' conclusion
that victims of violence will miss work and require medical
treatment, substantially impacting the national economy, and
therefore, impacting interstate commerce.5 2 Instead, the majority
reasons that we can not let Congress regulate in this area,
because if they can regulate here just because there is an impact,
where is their power to stop?53 It is a slippery slope. What will be
48 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
49 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612-19, 626-27 (applying framework in Lopez, Court held
that Congress did not have power to regulate violent criminal conduct based on its
aggregate effect on interstate commerce and that State Action requirement of Fourteenth
Amendment precludes that Congress from providing remedies against private individuals
for discriminatory conduct).
50 See e.g., H.R. REP No. 103-711, at 385 (1994); S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 41 (1993); S.
REP. NO. 101-545, at 33 (1990); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Article: Federalism and the
Court: Congress as the Audience, 575 ANNALS 145, 151 (2001) (suggesting that Congress
should develop record of facts supporting proposed legislation).
51 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615 (stating that holding otherwise would "allow
Congress to regulate any crime so long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime
has substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption ..... ); see
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 (acknowledging that government theories in support of statute
would give Congress power to regulate everything).
52 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (acknowledging that § 13981 "is supported by
numerous findings regarding the serious impact that gender-motivated violence has on
victims and their families."); see also Lisanne Newell Leasure, Commerce Clause
Challenges Spawned by United States v. Lopez are Doing Violence Against the Violence
against Women's Act (VA WA): A Survey of Cases and the Ongoing Debate Over How the
VA WA will Fare in the Wake of Lopez, 50 ME. L. REV. 409, 416-17 (1998) (discussing
congressional findings with regard to Violence Against Women Act).
53 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615; see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564
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left for the states to do? This is not an economic activity that
Congress is regulating, says the Court, so the impact of the
activity does not provide a proper basis for federal action.54
That second manner of reviewing the work of Congress would
not have looked familiar to Justice Marshall. In Gibbons v.
Ogden, and in McCulloch v. Maryland, he concluded that it is up
to Congress not the Court, to decide what is "necessary and
proper."55
The third way in which the current Supreme Court exhibits a
lack of deference to Congress is reflected in the Eleventh
Amendment cases that Judge Gibbons was discussing. There are
many cases where the current Supreme Court holds that
Congress cannot have access to a particular remedy to solve an
admittedly national problem.56 Congress cannot always subject
the states to suit because of the Eleventh Amendment, for
example, and thus in the Garrett case, which I mentioned before,
Congress was told that they cannot allow individuals to sue
states under the Americans With Disabilities Act.57
In the previous term the Supreme Court had also held that
Congress did not have a sufficient basis to allow the states to be
subject to suit under the Age Discrimination In Employment
Act, 58 in a case called Kimel, 9 because Congress had not made a
(reasoning that government theories in support of statute would give Congress power to
regulate everything).
54 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617. See Marianne Moody Jennings & Nim Razook,
United States v. Morrison: Where the Commerce Clause Meets Civil Rigbts and
Reasonable Minds Part Ways: A Point and Counterpoint from a Constitutional and Social
Perspective, 35 NEw ENG. L. REV. 23, 43-55 (2000) (presenting opposing viewpoints as to
whether the how "economic/non-economic distinction is "an unworkable distinction and an
invitation to return to ad hoc and uncertain commerce clause jurisprudence.").
55 See Gibbons v Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 47 (1824) (finding"[P]owers implied as necessary
and proper to carry into effect an exclusive power, are themselves exclusive."); McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819) (stating that national legislature must be given
discretion so that it could perform its duties "in a manner most beneficial to the people.");
see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (granting Congress power "to make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers...").
56 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996) (holding that Congress may
not abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 754 (1999) (extending state sovereignty bar announced in Seminole Tribe from
lawsuits against states in federal court to lawsuits against states in state court); Florida
Prepaid Post Secondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 665
(1999).
57 SeeBd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363-66 (2001).
58 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994) (making it unlawful for employer, including a State, to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any
individual, because of such individual's age).
59 Kimel v. Florida Bd. Of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
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sufficient showing to satisfy the Court that national intervention
was appropriate or necessary. 60 In those cases, the Court
interposed the brick wall of the Eleventh Amendment between
Congress and its goal.
Similarly, a few years ago in Printz v. United States,61 the
Court reviewed the Brady Act,62 where Congress was trying to
increase federal involvement in gun control. 63  Congress
attempted to do what the Supreme Court characterized as
"commandeering" state officials to help do background checks
when people apply for guns. 64 The Supreme Court told Congress
that they were not permitted to implement gun control laws in
that way.65 The federalism principles at stake, according to the
Court, prohibited Congress from employing local officials to do a
federal job. 66 The means Congress had chosen, in other words,
were inappropriate, even though the propriety of federal action
itself went unquestioned. 67
The final manner in which the Supreme Court is not at all
deferential to Congress concerns what Judge Gibbons has been
calling "pure constitutional law." The meaning of Marbury v.
Madison to the current Court is that once the Constitution says
what the law is, and the Supreme Court says what the
Constitution means, Congress has nothing more to say.68
60 See id. at 88-92 (specifically noting at 91: "In light of the lack of evidence of
widespread and unconstitutional age discrimination by the States, we hold that the
ADEA is not a valid exercise of Congress' power under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
61 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
62 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (1994) (mandating waiting period and background check prior to
handgun purchase).
63 See Printz, 521 U.S. 898, 902 (finding "The Act requires the Attorney General to
establish a national instant background check system by November 30, 1998...").
64 See id. at 914 (noting "[T]he Federal Government would in some circumstances do
well 'to employ the State officers as much as possible, and to attach them to the Union by
an accumulation of their emoluments'-which surely suggests inducing state officers to
come aboard by paying them, rather than merely commandeering their official services."
(citing THE FEDERALIST No. 36 (Alexander Hamilton)) (emphasis added)).
65 See id. at 925 (stating"[Olpinions of ours have made clear that the Federal
Government may not compel the States to implement, by legislation or executive action,
federal regulatory programs.").
66 See id. at 932 (finding" [Tihe whole object of the law is to direct the functioning of
the state executive, and hence to compromise the structural framework of dual
sovereignty. . ").
67 See id (noting"It is the very principle of separate state sovereignty that such a law
offends, and no comparative assessment of the various interests can overcome that
fundamental defect.").
68 See Ann Athouse, Inside the Federalism Cases: Concern about the Federal Courts,
574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 132, 140 (2001) (finding"In Boerne, the Supreme
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Congress, of course, is not permitted to contract what the
Constitution means. A recent example of this principle was
Dickerson v. United States,69 the Supreme Court case holding
unconstitutional the federal statute that attempted to revise the
legacy of Miranda v. Arizona.70 There the Supreme Court said
that Congress improperly tried to reduce protection for individual
liberties.71 They tried to change what the Supreme Court said the
Constitution means, by lessening protections; that is not
permissible.
However, the Supreme Court has also been disallowing
Congress from saying what the Constitution means in situations
where what Congress was trying to do was to increase protection
for individual rights.72 In 1993, reacting to a Supreme Court
decision that they regarded as not sufficiently protective of
individual religious rights, Congress enacted what they called
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act73 and tried to restore
some First Amendment protection for people exercising their
religions. The Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores74 looked
at what Congress had done and said no, Congress cannot say
what the Constitution means.75 We have already told you what
the Constitution means and Congress may not increase
constitutional protection any more than they may reduce
constitutional protection.
So in reviewing all these ways, this entire platter of ways in
Court responded with a strong statement of its intent to preserve the judicial grip on the
lawsaying [sic] function. The courts, not Congress, would control the interpretation of
constitutional rights.").
69 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
70 384 U.S. 436 (1969).
71 See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432 (holding that Miranda may not be overruled by Act
of Congress).
72 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (stating that Congress' power
is remedial rather than decreeing substance of Constitution); see also South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966) (suggesting that framers of the Fifteenth
Amendment "indicated that Congress was to be chiefly responsible for implementing the
rights created by that amendment Constitution"); Evan H. Caminker, Shifting the
Balance of Power? The Supreme Court, Federalism, & State Sovereign Immunity
'Approphate"Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1176
(2001) (stating "To be sure, one might counter that Section 5 should be interpreted as
containing one-way ratchet, such that Congress can act to 'correct' judicial under
protection but not overprotection of Section 1 rights."). see generally infra text
accompanying notes 78-80.
73 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2001).
74 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
75 See id. at 519 (stating that Congress has power to enforce these rights, not to
determine what constitutes violation of those rights).
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which the current Court refuses to give any deference to
Congress, I am tempted to do the terrible anachronistic thing
that no real historian would ever do, which is to ask, what would
Justice Marshall make of all this? If we could get him back here
today, what would he say about what the current Court has done
with his legacy? Judge Gibbons had some suggestions of what
Marshall might say about the Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence.
I would suggest that Marshall would be extremely surprised by
how the Court has been treating the Commerce Clause. It is
more difficult to evaluate what his response might be to some of
the Court's other decisions. City of Boerne and some of the other
recent cases involve judicial review of Congress' exercise of its
enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment, 76 which of
course, did not exist in Marshall's day. A hypothetical critic
might argue that Justice Marshall would not have understood
what we have been through in the past two hundred years, he
would not have understood that the federal government is no
longer a newborn fragile flower, and he would not have
understood that maybe the states need some protection from the
courts to help them fight back and equalize their role.
Even if I were attracted to that hypothetical argument, I would
show Justice Marshall the Fourteenth Amendment and explain
that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended precisely to
change the relationship between the federal and state
governments, and to further enhance federal power. 77 So when
Congress is acting under its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
power, Justice Marshall might well conclude that his comments
about the proper deference to be given to Congress are even more
to the point when Congress is trying to enact and enforce civil
rights legislation.
Amazingly, one case that has not yet been mentioned today
is Bush v. Gore.78 In that case, lurking in the background, if
Florida had not been able to select a slate of electors, was
Congress. Congress could have decided who the electors from
Florida would be if a controversy had arisen. But the Court
would not leave it for Congress to decide. So, it is certainly not
76 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
77 See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
78 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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news to a contemporary audience that the current Court has not
been deferential to Congress, but is making its own "political
law" decisions.
There is one more area that I would like to discuss briefly. I
have been talking about the separation of powers in the federal
government and the question of who should make the decisions
about what is a national question and what is a state question.
Certainly, I cannot claim that there is any novelty to my
perception that the current Supreme Court is not being
particularly deferential to Congress.
What I have not actually been hearing or reading much about
is the role of the Executive Branch in all of this. If you look at
what has happened in a number of different areas, particularly
with respect to civil rights enforcement, there are opportunities
for the Executive Branch to be doing a lot more to define the
national role.
For example, there were two kinds of cases that I was
mentioning where Congress has been told that certain remedies
were unavailable. First, they cannot have the Americans With
Disabilities Act or the Age Discrimination In Employment Act
apply to the states to the extent of allowing individual people to
sue the state for damages.7 9 If the state denies people their rights
under these federal acts, the Department of Justice can bring
suit.80 The federal government suing the state is an exception to
the Eleventh Amendment. So what ends up happening, given the
Court's current maximalist interpretation of the Marbury v.
Madison power and their current very minimalist interpretation
of their duty of deference to Congress, is that Congress cannot
provide that individual people can bring litigation against the
states, but they can, if they wish, provide enough money for a
79 See University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (holding Congress
did not validly abrogate states' sovereign immunity from suit by private individuals for
money damages under Title I of American Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents,
528 U.S. 62, 92 (2000) (holding Congress exceeded its authority under the enforcement
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore did not validly abrograte states'
sovereign immunity to suits by private individuals in Age Discrimination in Employment
Act).
80 See 29 U.S.C.S. §626 (Law. Co-op. 2001) (making remedies available for victims of
violations); 42 U.S.C.S. § 12117 (Law. Co-op. 2001) (giving authority to Attorney General
to enforce the statute); see also Ann C. Hodges, Article: Dispute Resolution under the
Americans with Disabihties Act: A Report to the Administrative Conference of the United
States, 9 ADMIN L.J. AM. U. 1007, 1028-29 (1996) (discussing how Department of Justice
is overwhelmed with its enforcement responsibilities under ADA).
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bloated federal bureaucracy to achieve their goals by bringing
suit on behalf of those individuals.
Printz tells us that Congress cannot use state officers to help to
enforce gun control laws.8' What can Congress do? They can
create a bloated federal bureaucracy and have federal agents
running all around the country doing background checks instead.
This is something that has not actually happened a whole lot,
either under the current or the last Administrations. But it is a
theoretical possibility.
In terms of the Executive's role in making national decisions,
here too we have to go back to Marbury v. Madison where, again,
Justice Marshall balanced an on-the-one-hand, with an on-the-
other-hand. Justice Marshall in Marbury did hold that President
Jefferson could be subject to a writ of mandamus if he violated
the law, and that the Court would decide what that law was.82
But at the same time, Justice Marshall also tried to provide an
ample realm of discretion for the President to make political
discretionary decisions.8 3 Here, too, Marshall may not have seen
so sharp a line between what is a p6litical decision and what is
not.
The current Court is not very deferential to the Executive
Branch either, unless they want to be. There are a few recent
examples of federal statutory interpretation where this comes up.
One major case earlier this term, the Solid Waste Agency case,8 4
concerned the enforcement of the federal Clean Water Act.8 5 That
was the case where the migratory birds wanted to stop in Illinois
and other people wanted to build over their hotel. Then the birds
would not have been able to travel interstate because they would
not have had lodging
81 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that Federal
Government may neither issue directives requiring states to address particular problems,
nor command the states' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or
enforce federal regulatory program).
82 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
83 See generally Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the
Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 55-56 (1994) (noting Marshall's view that
President is invested with certain important political powers, in exercise of which he is to
use his own discretion); see also Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and
Accountability, 37 CASE W. RES. 396, 417 (1987) (stating that for Marshall, "discretionary
acts" and "political acts" were synonymous.).
84 Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
85 33 U.S.C.S § 1344(a) (Law. Co-op. 2001) (regarding permits for dumping in
navigable waters).
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One of the questions that the Supreme Court might have
decided in this case was whether or not applying the Clean
Water Act to a body of water that is totally within a single state
and is not particularly navigable, except by birds, exceeded the
Commerce Clause power. Instead, what the Court said was that
the federal agency in question, the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers 86 had incorrectly interpreted their enabling statute,87
that they did not know what it meant, and that they were
applying their power too broadly. One reason, the Court said,
why they were sure that the Executive Branch was
misinterpreting their statutory mandate was the rule of
constitutional doubt.88 If, in fact, the statute went as far as the
agency believed, it might be considered unconstitutional. 89 So
there is one example where the Executive Branch got no
deference.
The Voting Rights Act 90 cases are another significant area
where the Executive Branch, specifically the Department of
Justice, has gotten very little deference in their interpretation of
what the federal statutes mean.91
Finally, in another case from last term, the Food and Drug
Administration case of Brown and Williamson,92 where the FDA
claimed the right to regulate tobacco as a drug, the Supreme
Court told the FDA that was not Congress' intent.93 The Court
also sometimes defers to Executive Branch decisions. Last term
in Geier v. American Honda,94 for example, the question was
whether or not federal law about airbags pre-empted the right of
individuals to bring a common law tort suit in their state.95 The
86 See Sohd Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 162 (discussing U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
interpretation of §404(a) of Clean Water Act).
87 See Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 167-73.
88 See Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 174 (stating that under such
misinterpretation, states' rights reserved to the states by the Constitution would be
infringed upon).
89 See id. (stating that if respondents were allowed their interpretation, states rights'
under Constitution would be jeopardized).
90 42 U.S.C.S. §1973.
91 See, e.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 341 (2000) (finding that
section 5 of Voting Rights Act does not prohibit pre-clearance of redistricting plan, as
was thought by Attorney General).
92 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
93 See id. at 132.
94 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
95 See id. at 865.
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Supreme Court said, five to four (although not the usual five and
the usual four), that there is federal pre-emption here,
prohibiting state tort actions.96 Was Congress clear about
wanting to pre-empt state law? Not a bit.
The Department of Transportation, however, in briefs written
during the course of litigation, after the fact, had taken the
position that it might be a good idea if the federal standards were
the only ones in town. And maybe it was a good idea to tell the
states, including New York, whose Court of Appeals had held
that airbag suits under state law were not pre-empted, that they
could not allow such suits. 97 So in Geier, a strong federal hand
came down to limit state policy, and the Court used the excuse of
deferring to the Executive Branch interpretation of the statute in
question.
Now, all of this, I think, raises a very fair question about the
possibility of separating law and politics. How political is the
Court being? People after Bush v. Gore have been concluding
that at some point you do have to start looking at the results, and
not just the process of "saying what the law is." And you have to
start looking at what ends this supreme judicial power is serving.
Is it a coincidence that the laws that the current Court has
struck down in Lopez and in tintz are gun control laws, where
the deciding vote, Clarence Thomas, thinks that those laws
probably violate the Second Amendment 98 anyway?
Is it a coincidence that one of the few cases, the Geier case
about the airbags, where the Supreme Court went out of its way
to defer to the agency in question in holding that federal power
pre-empts local power, is a case involving tort reform and not
civil rights enforcement? Justice Stevens, writing for four
dissenting members of the Court in the Geier case, pointedly
remarked, "this is a case about federalism"99 - the same thing
96 See id. at 867.
97 See Drattel v. Toyota, 92 N.Y.2d 35 (1998).
98 U.S. CONST. amend. II (finding"A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed."); See Printz v. United States 521 U.S. 898, 938 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(reasoning that challenged provisions of Brady Act may violate Second Amendment right
to bear arms); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(stating that Court "always ha[s] rejected readings of the Commerce Clause and the scope
of federal power that would permit Congress to exercise a police power").
99 529 U.S. at 887 (" 'This is a case about federalism,' (citation omitted) that is, about
respect for 'the constitutional role of the States as sovereign entities.' (citation omitted)")
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that the dissenters said in Bush v. Gore.'00 It is not as if the
Court is even being consistent in redirecting power to the states.
Bush v. Gore and Geier did the opposite. At some point you do
have to look to what Justice Marshall understood to be the
unseverable connection between law and politics - a connection
playing out more within the Court itself than among the three
branches of the federal government.
Larry Kramer, who was mentioned before, has begun to talk
about how the political branches could and should start fighting
back. 101 Although writing new legislation, as the cases discussed
earlier show, is not always successful because of the Court's
looming power of invalidation, other forms of reprisal can be
more effective and more final.
The idea that the area of state and national relations is one
where the Supreme Court needs to be circumspect for its own
protection would not have been news to Justice Marshall. After
all, while Marshall was new to the Court, Congress decided to
suspend the 1802 term of the Supreme Courtl0 2 because they did
not think they would like the results the Court would have
reached had it been sitting. After McCulloch, there was a
proposal floated to create a whole separate court to review things
happening in the states.103 People did not like the decision in
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee.104 So Justice Marshall certainly knew
100 531 U.S. 98, 142 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that state and federal
courts exist as separate and sovereign entities, as provided for by Framers).
101 See Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court v. Balance of Powers, N.Y. Times,
March 3, 2001, at A13; See also Larry Kramer, Understanding FederaLism, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 1485, 1552-53 (1994) (noting that state government lobbying groups are effective in
voicing states' concerns and interests in national political arena); Larry D. Kramer,
Putting the Politics back into the Political Safeguards of Federahsm, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
215, 281-86 (2000) (arguing that modern political parties and administrative bureaucracy
have combined to form new political safeguards and help ensure that states' interests are
heard in national politics).
102 See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Most Endangered Branch,
1801-1805, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 219, 223-25 (1998) (discussing "furious" debate over
constitutionality of proposed repeal of Judiciary Act of 1801); David E. Engdahl, John
Marshall's "Jeffersonian" Concept of Judicial Review, 42 DUKE L.J. 279, 318 (1992)
(examining "extended and heated debate... regarding 'judicial review' " after Court's
1801 term); Charles Gardner Geyh & Emily Field Van Tassel, The Independence of the
Judicial Branch in the New Republic, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 31, 79 (1998) (noting that
repeal became priority for both Republicans and President Jefferson).
103 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 436-37 (striking down Maryland law
imposing tax on Bank of United States); R. Kent Newmyer, John Marshall, McCulloch v.
Maryland, and the Southern States'Ri'ghts Tradition, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 875, 876
(2000) (noting amongst more radical proposals, one for separate court to address issues of
federalism).
104 14 U.S. 304, 352-53 (1816) (holding that Supreme Court has authority to review
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that extreme reactions from the political branches were a
possibility.
Kramer is beginning to ask questions like, what if the current
Congress were to suspend a Supreme Court term? Would not
that be interesting? In recent years, particularly during 1996,
most of the political reactions that we have had from Congress
have moved the ratchet in the wrong direction. Congress has
been stripping the federal courts of power to decide cases that the
states might not favor in areas like habeas corpus, immigration
and prison litigation.105
And Congress has not yet found a way, or a will, to fight back
in response to the cases I have been describing. Because the
Supreme Court's decisions are considered to be pure
constitutional law, Congress is simply not permitted to overrule
or modify what the Supreme Court has said.a06 There are
alternatives. In some areas, perhaps Congress could muster a
stronger factual record and reenact some of the invalidated
statutes. Congress could also empower the Executive Branch to
bring more suits instead of trying to provide for individual
litigation.
And finally, as to inserting the political judgment of the other
branches into judicial process, one area that should be very
interesting to watch in the coming few years is the area of
senatorial control of appointments, particularly judicial
appointments. What will happen in the Senate when there is a
Supreme Court appointment on the table? What will happen
when President Bush starts proposing, as he is about to, a slate
state court decisions interpreting federal law); see David P. Currie, The Constitution and
the Supreme Court: The Powers of the Federal Courts, 1801-1835, 49 U. Ci. L. REV. 646,
681 (1982) (noting that in Martin, Virginia court believed Congress lacked authority to
enable Supreme Court to review state court decisions); Mark L. Movesian, Sovereignty,
Compliance, and the World Trade Organization: Lessons from the History of Supreme
Court Review, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 775, 797-98 (1999) (discussing procedural aspects of
Martin and Virginia court's refusal to respond to Supreme Court's writ of error after
Martin's second appeal).
105 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C.S. § 1326(d) (Law. Co-op. 2001) (denying judicial review for
aliens in criminal proceedings except under certain circumstances); 28 U.S.C.S. § 2254(b)
(Law. Co-op. 2001) (allowing federal court to entertain application for writ of habeas
corpus only after state remedies are exhausted); 42 U.S.C.S. § 1997e(a) (Law. Co-op. 2001)
(requiring administrative remedies to be exhausted before action may be brought by
prisoner with respect to prison conditions).
106 See generally Steven Pure, Symposium Congress: Does It Abdicate Its Power"
Congress-Supreme Court Relations: Strategies of Power, 19 ST. LouIs U. PUB. L. REV.
117, 118-21 (2000) (discussing power Congress and Supreme Court have over each other).
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of judges for the federal judiciary? The question of the relation of
law and politics, and the relation of Congress to the Court, is one
on which Justice Marshall had many thoughts, and I would have
to agree with Judge Gibbons, that his thoughts were wiser and
more sophisticated than the thoughts we are hearing from the
Court today. Thank you.

